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Court Delay and the Bar: A Rejoinder
Hans Zeisel
Some time ago, I tried to show that our trial
courts would not increase their delay if they
were to become more liberal in granting motions for continuing a trial, provided such
motion is made in time, and another case,
1
whatever its age, can be tried instead. This
was to refute the attempt of some courts to
blame the bar for the court's delay, only because every so often a lawyer will not be ready
to try a case on the court appointed day. The
courts, I concluded, should not look to the
bar for remedying their delay but at themselves instead.
Judge Tauro, chief of the Superior Court of
Massachusetts, has written a thoughtful dissent from my thesis. 2 Not disputing the correctness of my theory, Judge Tauro thinks it
impractical advice to the court. He then returns to the broader background of the problem
by reasserting that the unwholesome concentration of the trial bar "undoubtedly aggravates court congestion." And he goes on to
blame the trial bar not only for being too small
inexperienced
but also for having too many
3
members.
its
among
lawyers
Since I share Judge Tauro's belief that
blaming anybody-bar or courts-will not
cure the sickness, I should like to pursue the
two alleged evils of the trial bar-concentration and partial inexperience-to a point at
which one can see with some precision whether
or not they are indeed contributing to the delay problem.
Before discussing the merits of these claims
it will be useful to recall the fundamentals of
the court delay problem.
4
First, as we have shown, the issue is not
1. Zeisel, "Court Delay Caused by the Bar?", 54 A. B. A.
Journal 886 (September 1968).
2. Tauro, "Court Delay and the Trial Bar-One Judge's Opinion," 52 Judicature414 (May 1969).
3. Pp. 414, 416.
4. Zeisel, Kalven, Buchholz, Delay in the Court (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1959), pp. 3, 4.

who or what is to blame for the delay, but
rather how it can be effectively eliminated.
The difference is important. Anything that increases the courts' trial load can be "blamed":
more automobiles, more accidents, more claim
consciousness, the parties' unwillingness to
settle, and so forth. But to reduce delay is
another problem, and quite a precise one at
that. For a proposed remedy to be effective it
must accomplish one or more of the following
three objectives:
1. reduce the number of cases the courts
must try,
2. reduce the court time it takes to try these
cases, and
3. increase the total annual hours spent by
the court in trying cases.
If a remedy does not accomplish any of
these objectives, it is-to remain in the language of medicine-not more than a placebo;
5
it may look like a remedy but be none.
The argument in the article with which
Judge Tauro takes issue concerns point 3. We
urged the courts to be liberal in the granting
of motions for continuance of a trial date, no
matter how old the case, if that motion is
made seasonably, and made jointly by all litigants concerned. I tried to show, that the
delay measure of the court would be in no
way affected by thus letting an old case grow
even older, since, by definition, a younger
case would take its place, thus leaving the
average delay untouched. I argued that this
was the only sensible way for the courts to
meet the problem of lawyer concentration-if
the problem existed.
The thing to remember is that there is only
one way and no other that such concentration
can hurt the court's efforts to eliminate delay:
if this concentration brings about a situation
in which a judge, who is ready to try a case,
is unable to find one.
5. Delay in the Court, pp. 5, 6.
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To be sure I have never been an assignment judge, but I have studied the methods
used by the assignment judges in various
courts. I offer two exhibits in evidence.
Exhibit one is the Circuit Court of Cook
County here in Chicago. Here the assignment
judge is not known to be generous in granting
motions for continuance.
Exhibit two is the Pittsburgh Court of
Common Pleas, which operates along the lines
I have been advocating, seldom hesitating to
take a younger case if the scheduled older
one is not ready."
I am reproducing below what are probably
the most comprehensive and most recent statistics on the concentration of the trial bar in
7
a major metropolitan area:
Jury Cases Tried in the City of Chicago
in the U. S. District Court, the Circuit Court of
Cook County, and the Municipal Court,
First Department
Court Year 1967-68
Number of Cases
Tried During That
Year By Each Lawyer
in this Group
15 and up
13 and 14
11 and 12
Ten

Per Cent of
Lawyers in
Each Group
1.3
.6
.6
1.0

Nine
Eight
Seven
Six
Five
Four
Three
Two
One

Per Cent of
Cases in
Each Group
7.9
2.9

2.6
3.4
3.4
3.5
6.8
9.9
9.8

7.4
10.5
18.2
44.5
100.0
(959)

10.3
10.9

12.5
15.2
100.0
(2,783)

Such statistics are being compiled to shed
8
light on the so-called concentration problem.
112

What, if anything, do such statistics prove
with respect to the one issue that is here relevant: namely whether this concentration results in a situation where a judge, ready to try
a case, cannot find one?
I submit that such statistics, showing the
degree of concentration of cases, prove nothing. Those who continue blaming the bar for
interfering with the court's efforts to eliminate
delay, must come up with one piece of evidence and one only:
Judge X, on such and such a date, at such and
such an hour, was ready to try a case, but the assignment judge was unable to find one for him.
As a result so and so many potential trial hours
were lost.
My guess is that the Chicago court, if it
were ever to publish relevant statistics on the
delay problem, would report such incidents,
and that the Pittsburgh court could not. 9 It
is for this reason that advocating the Pittsburgh procedure rather than the Chicago system is more than a theoretical exercise.
Judge Tauro, as I mentioned, has, however,
still another arrow to his bow. He makes a
point not often heard, namely that:
Conscientious but inexperienced trial lawyers tend
to waste valuable court time because of their ineptness. 10
Perhaps some lawyers do. But then the inportant question is: how many trial lawyers
are inexperienced and at the same time conscientious enough to try harder than is neces6. There might, of course, be other reasons why the Chicago
court, at the most recent count, tries cases that are on the
average 58.2 months old, still leading the nation, while the Pittsburgh court has one of the best records among metropolitan
courts with an average delay of only 23 months.
7. From the Cook County Verdict Reporter.
8. Some courts have statistics that go beyond recording the trial
attorneys; they show the number of pending cases for each law
firm and point to whatever concentration they reveal.
9. If such gaps never occur, then all the talk about lawyers interfering with the court's efforts to cut delay is not pertinent
anyway.
10. P. 416.
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sary? How often do they waste the court's
time? And, in toto, how much of the court's
time do they waste?
All these questions need answers, and I do
not know them all. But on the most important
first point I happen to have some relevant
statistics.
In the course of our study of the American
jury system, we collected reports from judges
all across the country on the jury trials over
which they presided. With respect to the civil
jury trials, predominantly personal injury
trials, we asked the trial judges this question
about the quality of counsel who tried the
cases before them: "Was the plaintiff's (defendant's) lawyer an experienced trial lawyer?" Following is the summary of these reports:
Quality of Trial Counsel
As Rated by the Presiding Judge
(2291 civil jury trials)

Per Cent
85

Defenda nt's
Counsiel
Per Ce nt
91

Total
Per Cent
88

15
100

9
100

12
100

Plaintiff's
Counsel

Experienced
Not experien iced

This is a good cross-section, and we thought,
"If anyone can make a meaningful judgment
on a question such as the quality of counsel,
11
the trial judge can."
So here we have 12 per cent of counsel rated
as inexperienced. We like to think that this
is a modest percentage that bespeaks, if anything, the high quality of the trial bar.
Still, the 12 per cent inexperienced lawyers
could cause some damage. But where is the
evidence? Judge Tauro thoughtfully specifies
that he is afraid only of the inexperienced
11. H. Kalven, Jr., and H. Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1968), p. 50.

lawyer who is also conscientious. Is it not also
possible that many an inexperienced lawyer,
because he either does not know better or is
not too conscientious, may interfere less rather
than more with the judge's conduct of the
trial? In any even, there is not much an overzealous lawyer can spoil if the judge conducts
the trial with a firm hand.
There is one other danger in this imprecise
blame of the bar, because the facts, if they
were ever to come into the open, might well
confound these accusations and turn them
upside down.
It is, for instance, quite possible that the
so-called lawyer concentration aids rather
than hinders the elimination of court delay.
Suppose that the more cases a law firm has
pending, the greater will be the percentage
of cases it will want settled without trial. If
that were so-and any one of the computerequipped courts could produce interesting statistics on this point-a more equal distribution
of cases among law firms might well reduce
the number of settlements, and thereby add to
the courts' trial load. And as to the inexperienced trial lawyer, might not he too be more
hesitant than his experienced colleague to try
a case? And if he were to ask an experienced
colleague to try the case for him, he must
share his fee with him-another inducement
for the inexperienced lawyer to settle the case.
Thus, if all the facts were on the table, we
might conceivably see that the courts indeed
profit from a concentrated and inexperienced
trial bar. After all, only two or three per cent
of all claims ever reach trial; a minute increase
of that proportion could prove catastrophic.
In any event, eliminating or reducing court
delay is a precise management problem which,
if it is to be solved, requires precise measurements. Blame or, for that matter, praise will
no longer do. In the meantime, the sickness is
growing.
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